Since people often look at me like I’m a lunatic when I tell them I took philosophy in university, I’m posting this as an example of the type of paper I wrote during that time. Not that it is necessarily a typical philosophy paper, but it is representative of the sort of papers written by yours truly.

 
Ethical relativism comes in several forms. Firstly, descriptive relativism is the theory that real-world cultures vary greatly in terms of morality. Secondly, meta-ethical relativism states that cultures differ greatly in their meanings and uses of moral terms so as to render cross cultural discussions of morality and ethics unintelligible. Lastly, normative relativism is the theory that the actions that individuals ought to take are determined by the prevailing opinions of their culture. Another form of this last theory contends that persons ought to act according to their personal moral standards. The following discussion will attempt to refute each of these forms of ethical relativism.

Descriptive relativism is an important theory because it is often argued that, if it is true, at least one of the other theories of ethical relativism is also true. While there are certainly differences from one culture to the next on a wide variety of subjects, it is disputable whether or not there are meaningful differences between cultures in the area of morality. As to the exact moral actions that individuals in differing cultures are expected to perform, there is evident disagreement. Yet, in terms of prevailing principles of a more general kind there may be markedly less difference. For instance, while cultures may differ as to whether euthanasia can be a charitable act, most, if not all, cultures believe that charity itself is a moral virtue. Therefore, while the root of this disagreement may seem to be a difference in a general moral principle, it is actually in a difference in the application of the same general principle to a particular situation. Therefore, there may be less moral disagreement among cultures over morality than it would seem when examining isolated cases or particular situations.
    
However, if it is given that cultures disagree greatly even in terms of general moral principles, this says little about the validity of the moral systems in each particular culture. For it is true in the field of morals, as it is in all other fields, that where there is real disagreement, at least one party must be mistaken. Furthermore, where the opposing views are mutually exclusive, one must be right and the other wrong. For example, where culture A believes that a moral action is wrong and culture B believes that it is not wrong, either culture A or culture B must be wrong. Therefore, a culture’s belief in the truth of a moral proposition does not make that proposition true. Hence, whether descriptive relativism is true or not is not relevant to any discussion of ethical theory, and is not valid evidence for the other forms of relativism discussed hereafter.
    
Meta-ethical relativism is also a descriptive theory. It states that differing cultures attach different meanings to ethical terms. It follows that when there is moral disagreement between people of different cultures, that the people are not actually talking about the same concepts, even though they may be using identical language. For instance, in a cross-cultural discussion about what constitutes “good,” individuals from different cultures will be attaching entirely different meanings to the word. It follows from this that cross cultural discussions of ethics are meaningless, and that to speak about ethics as independent of culture is impossible.
    
Alasdair MacIntyre, a proponent of meta-ethical relativism, uses as evidence for this theory the tendency for arguments about morality to be continually disputed, with the parties involved never reaching consensus. As examples of arguments where consensus seems unattainable, he uses the debate over just war, the debate over abortion, and the debate over whether there should be universal health care. He argues that many differing opinions are based on logically valid arguments, and that “[f]rom our rival conclusions we can argue back to our rival premises; but when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the invocation of one premise against another becomes a matter of assertion and counter-assertion.”¹ From this tendency to differ in opinions about premises, MacIntyre concludes that the meanings that the debaters employ must differ. Yet, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that people often argue about premises that the meaning of the words involved differ between parties. Nor does it follow from the fact that disagreements tend to be long standing that the meanings of moral terms are different. This merely shows that the disagreements are not in the arguments themselves, but in the premises of those arguments.  
    
One simple example of an argument where both sides have might have valid arguments, and yet differ in opinion regarding premises is an argument as to whether parents ought to give their children cough syrup when they are sick. One side may argue that giving cough syrup to a sick child will improve their health, and so parents ought to give their children cough syrup when they are sick. The other side may argue that giving cough syrup to children is harmful to their health, and so it should not be given to children. Here both sides agree that parents ought to do what is beneficial to their child’s health, but these arguments differ in their premises regarding cough syrup. It does not follow that in this case the meanings of the words that each arguer uses are different, merely that the disagreement lies in the factual premises about cough syrup, rather than the moral principles of parenting. This is also true in the cases that MacIntyre puts forward. For instance, while all parties in the abortion debate may agree that killing persons is wrong, they may still disagree as to whether or not a fetus is a person. That the disagreement lies in fact and not necessarily in moral principles shows that there may be less consensus about matter of fact than matters of morality in moral debates. MacIntyre’s thesis of ethical relativism is, therefore, not supported by the fact that some debates in the moral sphere lack consensus, and neither is it supported the tendency for moral disagreements to be rooted in differing premises.
    
Furthermore, moral terms, in comparison to other terms, seem to be common among all cultures, as is evident from early texts. Moreover, the moral terms of ancient cultures are intelligible for modern readers from all cultures, so the meanings of moral terms do not seem to be relative to culture or age. Another illustration of the non-relative nature of moral terms is the fact that individuals change their minds regarding moral beliefs and yet retain their original beliefs about the meanings of ethical terms. Thus, moral beliefs are not mere products of the meanings of the terms involved, and moral disagreement is not a direct result of relativity in moral terms. Thus meta-ethical relativism ought to be rejected.
    
A more common form of ethical relativism is normative relativism. This is the theory that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined by the prevailing opinions of the culture in which they are performed. It has been shown that the existence of differing views of morality between cultures does not give justification for the moral theories particular to each culture. Therefore, the existence of moral disagreement cannot then be used as evidence for normative relativism. This theory also has many problems which make it an unacceptable theory.
    
Firstly, normative relativism cannot account for moral disagreements between individuals in the same culture.  Even within a particular culture, there is moral disagreement, and it is necessarily impossible to provide justification for moral beliefs at the level of individuals in the same culture if normative relativism is correct. Hence, if normative relativism is accepted then moral disagreements within particular cultures are unresolvable.  
    
Secondly, normative relativism is not a useful theory for persons of multiple cultures. If these individuals employ cultural relativism, it is possible that they will be forced to hold two contradictory beliefs as both being correct. The normative relativist may argue that such a person ought to hold only those beliefs that are relevant to the culture in which that person is acting at any given moment, and will that way avoid holding two contradictory beliefs at the same time; but this would seem difficult to put into practice, for it may not be clear exactly what culture a multicultural person is acting in at any given time. Therefore, normative relativism may lead to confusion.
    
Another problem with the theory of normative relativism is that it does not allow for moral progress. This is because a single culture is at all times by definition fully justified in its moral beliefs. If a culture is its own moral standard, it is meaningless to speak of a culture either progressing or regressing in the moral sphere. Yet, moral progress is a goal of culture, and any acceptable theory of morality must account for this.
    
An issue related to the fact that in normative relativism a culture is its own moral standard, is that it follows that any moral action whatsoever is permissible as long as that action is not prohibited in that culture. This means that many actions that nearly all individuals in history do not condone, are nonetheless acceptable in the culture in which they occurred. Events such as the holocaust are justified under this theory of morality, since normative relativism gives no grounds for the condemnation of acts that most cultures find heinous, as long as they are acceptable according to the moral standards of the culture in which they occur.
    
Another implication of normative relativism that many will find unacceptable is that it is silent on issues where cultures interact. It cannot allow for one side in a war between two cultures to be in the wrong, for instance. Each culture is necessarily correct. Under this theory, the Vikings were justified in their conquest of Europe, and in every action that they performed during that conquest that was accepted by their own culture. A theory where marauding, raping, and pillaging are all acceptable is not a good theory of morality, nor is it one that is useful on the international stage.
    
Proponents of this theory, however, generally attach to it the concept of tolerance. The addition of tolerance, they believe, will restrict the types of moral actions that can be permissible, both within a culture, and in interaction between cultures. The theory of normative relativism with the inclusion of tolerance states that what is morally right is what is believed to be right in that culture, except for those beliefs that are incompatible with tolerance either of people’s action or beliefs, or of other cultures in general. Yet, this theory of normative ethical relativism is not a relativistic theory at all, for it includes a universal demand for tolerance.  
    
However, the relativist may argue that while there is one universal—tolerance—all other moral values are relative. This is problematic because intolerant acts, such as the holocaust, must nonetheless be tolerated if the only universal value is tolerance. Therefore, the addition of the universal value of tolerance does not free this theory from the aforementioned problems.
    
A last type of relativism is individual relativism. This theory comes in two forms. First, it can be a descriptive theory of the morality of individuals, stating that there exist differences between individuals in their beliefs about morality. The criticisms of descriptive relativism for cultures also apply to individual relativism, that is: Differences in moral beliefs are often overstated as a result of concentration on specific actions rather than overriding principles, and the truth or falsity of the theory is not evidence for other types of ethical relativism.          

Second, individual relativism can take the form of a normative theory. In this form it states that individuals determine their own moral standards. This normative theory is subject to the same criticisms that were mentioned above for normative relativism in cultures. It, too, allows for actions that most readers would find unacceptable, does not account for moral disagreement, and does not allow for personal moral progress. Lastly, the addition of tolerance into this theory does not remedy its inadequacy as a normative theory of morality.
    
In all its forms, therefore, ethical relativism is a problematic theory. Descriptive relativism is debatable, and its truth or falsity does little to enhance ethical discussion. Meta-ethical relativism is not consistent with the real world use of ethical terms. Furthermore, normative relativism, whether including the value of tolerance or not, does not allow for restrictions of what seem to be the worst behaviors, and does not account for moral progress or aid in cross cultural disputes. Individual relativism fairs no better. It follows that all forms of ethical relativism are either false or irrelevant.